Company research

GRUPO AEROMEXICO SAB DE CV

AERO

Current Tracked Holder
1
One-Year Insider Activity
Purchases 2 $1.3M
Sales 5 $2.0M

Price history

Price history loads when this section approaches view.

Quarter-End Change Analysis

2026-Q2REV. 1

Aeromexico Q2 2026: premium pricing overcame lower capacity, but costs absorbed the gain

Revenue and unit revenue rose despite slightly lower capacity, while currency, fuel and operating costs compressed margins and kept the earnings improvement incomplete.

By June 30, Aeromexico had demonstrated stronger pricing and premium demand despite operating slightly less capacity. First-quarter revenue increased 13.3% year over year to $1.34 billion while available seat capacity declined 1.2%. Total revenue per available seat kilometer rose 14.6%, and premium-cabin revenue represented 42% of passenger revenue, up from 41%.

The revenue improvement did not translate proportionately into profit. Adjusted EBITDAR increased 5% to $335.8 million, but its margin fell two percentage points to 25%; operating income was broadly flat at $141.8 million and operating margin declined 1.4 points to 10.6%. Cost per available seat kilometer excluding fuel rose 17.8%, reflecting wages, fleet ownership and other operating costs, while fuel cost per liter increased 13.1%. A 14% appreciation of the Mexican peso against the U.S. dollar also raised dollar-reported costs.

Operating cash flow was $200.6 million, liquidity stood at $1.2 billion and adjusted net debt to EBITDAR improved to 1.7 times from 1.8 times at year-end. For the second quarter, management expected revenue of $1.47 billion to $1.52 billion, but an adjusted EBITDAR margin of only 17%-20% and operating margin of 4%-7%. That outlook implied continued demand strength alongside normal seasonality and limited near-term cost leverage.

Aeromexico shares returned 28.5% during the quarter, outperforming the S&P 500's 14.9%; the largest daily move was a 10.5% gain on April 8, before the results release. The price strength is consistent with greater confidence in pricing and premium demand, but it cannot be attributed to the later filing. The key unresolved issue was whether revenue per seat could continue rising fast enough to offset labor, fuel, ownership and foreign-exchange pressure.

Current reported holders

Portfolio ManagerRecent activitySharesValuePortfolio
Seth KlarmanBaupost Group LLC/MA
AEROUnchanged
4,880,188
$87,843,000
1.62%

Long-term company research

Fundamental analysis

Updated 2026-08-09

Grupo Aeroméxico Fundamental Research

Business Model and Scope

Aeroméxico transports passengers and cargo through a Mexico City-centered network, sells ancillary services and operates loyalty and maintenance relationships. Passenger tickets and ancillaries produced $4.861 billion of 2025 revenue; cargo $312.4 million and other revenue $187.7 million. Domestic revenue was $1.967 billion and international $3.394 billion. The airline ended 2025 with 165 aircraft, primarily leased, and used Boeing 737, 787 and Embraer fleets.

Travelers and corporate accounts use and pay for flights; freight customers pay for belly cargo; loyalty partners pay for points and access; governments indirectly shape airports and bilateral rights. Customers need safe, reliable movement, schedule breadth, connections and service. Aeroméxico sits between aircraft/airport/fuel/labor suppliers and travelers. Its hub, slots, brand, loyalty programme and Delta relationship are material business systems, while aircraft leases and ticket liabilities finance capacity and working capital.

Customers and Purchasing Decisions

Passengers can choose Volaris, Viva, U.S. and international carriers, connecting itineraries, buses, cars, videoconferencing or no trip. Cargo can use other airlines, trucking or integrators. Buyers compare schedule, fare, nonstop access, reliability, safety, loyalty benefits, baggage and service. Business travelers value frequency and connections; leisure travelers are more price-sensitive.

Switching an individual booking is easy, though status, points, corporate agreements and network schedules create friction. A hub and airport slots can be difficult for competitors to replicate, but passengers will switch after disruptions or large fare gaps. The Delta partnership historically strengthened cross-border connectivity, yet U.S. DOT termination of antitrust immunity effective January 2026 ended coordinated pricing, schedules and revenue sharing. Code sharing and arm's-length cooperation can remain, so the economic benefit is reduced rather than necessarily eliminated. Brand value depends on operational reliability and network access, not recognition alone.

Profit Creation and Value Capture

Revenue equals capacity (available seat miles) times passenger revenue per seat mile plus ancillary/cargo/loyalty income. Cost includes fuel, labor, airport/navigation, maintenance, sales, owned-aircraft depreciation and lease expense/interest. Because the cost of a flight changes little with the last passenger, load factor, yield and mix create high operating leverage.

2025 capacity was 35.804 billion ASMs, load factor 85.9%, RASM 15.0 cents and CASM 12.5 cents. Revenue fell 4.6% to $5.361 billion, operating income fell to $928.1 million and net income to $351.9 million as passenger revenue declined and net finance cost rose to $514.2 million. Operating cash was $913.1 million, down from $1.368 billion; property, equipment and major-maintenance cash was $334.5 million.

Customers pay before travel, so advance ticket liabilities provide working capital; cancellations, refunds and capacity disruption reverse it. Major maintenance is capitalized, while routine maintenance is expensed, making cash and accounting timing differ. Incremental route returns require fares and ancillaries to cover variable flight costs and contribute to aircraft, lease, crew and network overhead. High load factor without adequate yield can destroy value, while a hub connection may support profitable network flows not visible at one-segment level.

Industry Structure and Capital Cycle

Airline entry needs operating certification, slots, aircraft, crews, systems and distribution, but leased aircraft make capacity easier to add. Airports, lessors, Boeing, fuel suppliers and unionized skilled labor have bargaining power. Price-transparent passengers and corporate buyers have power, and low-cost carriers discipline fares. Exit is difficult because leases, employee duties and tickets remain after routes stop.

The capital cycle is recurrent: strong fares cause orders and leases, deliveries add seats after demand changes, and fixed capacity triggers discounting. Aeroméxico added 17 737 MAX aircraft and one 787-9 during 2025 and committed to more 2026 deliveries. Chapter 11 reset leases and retired inefficient aircraft, but those savings are finite and cannot prevent a future oversupply cycle. Airport constraints and slots can ration capacity, while regulatory decisions such as the Delta immunity termination can change competitive conduct without changing aircraft supply.

Sources and Durability of Competitive Advantage

Aeroméxico's plausible advantages are Mexico City hub connectivity, international and corporate positioning, airport slots, a modern fleet, loyalty relationships, operational know-how and Delta/SkyTeam cooperation. More destinations and frequencies improve connection utility; loyalty and corporate contracts reinforce demand; a modern common fleet can lower fuel and maintenance per seat.

Durability is conditional. Low-cost rivals can add domestic or U.S. capacity, airports can redistribute slots, passengers can multi-home, and arm's-length Delta cooperation is weaker than immunized joint pricing. Fuel or currency shocks can erase fleet efficiency. New aircraft technology can be acquired by competitors; Boeing quality or delivery problems can impair the same concentrated fleet. Network advantage is durable only if RASM and after-lease returns exceed the cost of maintaining frequencies and fleet commitments.

Operating System and Strategic Trade-offs

Revenue management forecasts demand and prices seats; network planning allocates aircraft; sales and loyalty acquire traffic; operations coordinate crews, airports and maintenance; procurement secures fuel and parts; finance manages leases, debt and ticket cash. Aircraft delivery, crew training, maintenance reserves and schedule sales must align months ahead.

More frequency improves customer choice and connections but lowers load factor if demand is insufficient. Leasing preserves fleet flexibility and lowers upfront cash but creates fixed contractual payments and return-condition liabilities. Owning aircraft builds assets but concentrates residual-value risk. Fuel hedging stabilizes cost while forfeiting favorable moves; Aeroméxico had no interest-rate swaps at year-end. Premium service supports yield but adds labor and cabin cost. The system works only when schedule, staffing, fleet reliability, price and hub connections are jointly optimized.

Financial Resilience

Cash and equivalents were $1.024 billion, including $27.5 million restricted. Fixed-rate USD loans carried $1.099 billion book value; finance leases $77.0 million; lease liabilities were $2.879 billion. Contractual cash flows were larger than carrying values: fixed loans required $93.9 million within 2–12 months, $93.9 million in year two, $687.7 million in years two-to-five and $715.2 million thereafter including interest; finance leases required $80.5 million; operating lease cash flows totaled $3.877 billion, including $641.0 million within one year.

Debt was predominantly fixed, limiting immediate benchmark-rate exposure, but new leases/refinancing and $514 million net finance cost show the economic burden. Dollar obligations create currency exposure against peso cash; passenger revenue is partly dollar-linked. Asset quality is weak under stress: leased aircraft are obligations, owned/specialized spares can lose value, and advance tickets require future service.

A severe scenario combines 25% demand decline, jet fuel at $4 per gallon, peso depreciation, route disruption and closed unsecured markets. Revenue falls faster than flight cost; ticket refunds and collateral can consume working capital while $700 million-plus one-year loan/lease cash flows remain. Cash, positive operating cash and capacity cuts provide time, but lease cancellation and labor reductions are costly. Aeroméxico's restructured fixed debt and $1 billion cash improve near-term survival, yet $3.9 billion lease cash commitments make resilience dependent on continuing operations and lessor cooperation.

Capital Allocation and Shareholder Outcomes

Aeroméxico reinvested $334.5 million in property, equipment and major maintenance and expanded/renewed the fleet. It made a $204.6 million capital-stock reimbursement before the global offering. The November primary offering sold 7.394 million ADSs (ten shares each) plus 7.0 million Mexican shares; secondary shares transferred ownership but did not fund the company. Capital allocation must distinguish primary proceeds from selling-holder liquidity.

Outstanding ordinary shares ended at 1.459 billion. Basic weighted shares were 1.449 billion and diluted 1.459 billion, with 9.937 million trust shares adding dilution. Restricted shares fell from 19.203 million to 2.802 million after 17.568 million exercised, 1.260 million granted and 93,110 forfeited; 2025 equity-settled compensation expense was $7.373 million. There was no ongoing defined repurchase plan.

Fleet investment creates value per share only when after-maintenance, after-lease route cash exceeds the primary equity and claims used. Reimbursements transfer cash but do not offset lease obligations. The IPO enlarged liquidity and the public denominator; its per-share success depends on sustaining post-reorganization margins after Delta changes, not on enterprise revenue alone.

Legal and Regulatory Exposure

Aviation safety and certification are high-probability operational obligations and very-high-severity tail risks. Grounding, accident or maintenance failure can halt aircraft and impair trust for years; technical remediation is possible, but harm is not fully reversible. Competition and bilateral/slot regulation is high probability and high severity: the DOT's immunity termination already removed joint pricing/schedule coordination, with multi-year revenue and network effects; appeal or new authorization is uncertain.

Labor regulation and collective bargaining have medium-to-high probability and high severity because pilots, flight attendants and skilled employees can disrupt the network; agreements are reversible through negotiation, but strikes and wage resets persist. Environmental and emissions rules have high probability and medium-to-high severity over years through fuel, fleet and offset cost; fleet renewal can mitigate but not eliminate it. Consumer/refund, data/privacy and anti-bribery compliance have medium probability and medium-to-high severity; fines, sales restrictions or licence consequences can last years. Mexican equity-deficit rules are a specific governance exposure: the filing states an equity deficit exceeding two-thirds of capital may be grounds for dissolution upon an interested party's legal request, though actual probability is unresolved.

Conclusion, Uncertainties and Disconfirming Evidence

Value creation: Aeroméxico combines hub connectivity, aircraft, crews and commercial systems to earn passenger, ancillary and cargo revenue above flight and capital cost. Retention: slots, network schedules, corporate/loyalty relationships and operational capability can retain value. Durability: the hub is durable but fares, fuel, low-cost capacity and the loss of Delta antitrust immunity make returns cyclical and contestable. Financial resilience: $1.024 billion cash and positive operating cash help, while fixed debt reduces immediate rate risk; $3.877 billion lease cash flows and high finance cost limit resilience. Common-share benefit: public shareholders receive benefit only if post-reorganization route cash grows faster than fleet commitments, reimbursements and diluted shares.

Counterevidence includes a 4.6% revenue decline despite more aircraft, lower load factor and RASM, 33% lower operating cash, $514 million net finance cost and an equity deficit. The thesis would be invalidated by sustained post-immunity loss of U.S. network economics, repeated safety failure, load factor/yield unable to cover CASM and leases, fuel/currency shocks not passed to fares, inability to meet lease deliveries or maturities, or per-share cash falling as fleet capacity grows. Business quality is separate from valuation; no investment action is offered.

Financial data loads when this section approaches view.

Insider activity

1-year insider activity

Open-market purchases and sales only.

ADS context. An ADS may not represent one underlying ordinary share. Insider transaction prices and share counts may therefore use a different unit from the U.S.-listed security and may require conversion before comparison.

Checked 2026-10-02
DateInsiderTypeSharesPriceValueSource
2026-08-12Murray Aaron JamesChief Commercial OfficerSale355,600$2$562,915SEC ↗
2026-05-21Murray Aaron JamesOfficer, Chief Commercial OfficerSale250,000$2$387,500SEC ↗
2026-05-21Murray Aaron JamesOfficer, Chief Commercial OfficerSale100,000$2$159,000SEC ↗
2026-05-20Murray Aaron JamesOfficer, Chief Commercial OfficerSale200,000$2$304,000SEC ↗
2026-05-20Murray Aaron JamesOfficer, Chief Commercial OfficerSale400,000$2$600,000SEC ↗
2026-03-19Tricio Haro EduardoDirectorPurchase500,000$1$660,000SEC ↗
2026-03-19Tricio Haro EduardoDirectorPurchase500,000$1$660,000SEC ↗