Reported portfolio
Carl Icahn
Icahn Capital LP
- Reported portfolio value
- $8,553,641,000
- Current positions
- 12
- Top five concentration
- 91.2%
- Largest position
- 48.5%
- New positions
- 0
- Closed positions
- 1
Reported holdings
| Company | Portfolio | Quarterly activity | Shares | Reported price | Reported value | Updated / source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
IEP Icahn Enterprises LP | 48.49% | Unchanged | 549,400,539 | $8 | $4,147,974,000$0 | 13F2026-03-31 ↗ |
CVI CVR Energy Inc | 28.01% | Added 1.1% | 71,201,875+783,404 | $34 | $2,395,943,000+$604,497,000 | 13F2026-03-31 ↗ |
UAN CVR Partners, LP | 6.17% | Unchanged | 4,164,274 | $127 | $527,489,000+$100,651,000 | 13F2026-03-31 ↗ |
CTRI Centuri Holdings, Inc. | 4.90% | Unchanged | 14,336,044 | $29 | $418,756,000+$56,771,000 | 13F2026-03-31 ↗ |
IFF International Flavors and Fragrances Inc. | 3.63% | Unchanged | 4,275,000 | $73 | $310,151,000+$22,059,000 | 13F2026-03-31 ↗ |
ECHO EchoStar Corporation | 1.92% | Reduced 58.1% | 1,404,542−1,950,000 | $117 | $164,430,000−$200,209,000 | 13F2026-03-31 ↗ |
AEP American Electric Power Company | 1.85% | Unchanged | 1,205,300 | $131 | $157,991,000+$19,008,000 | 13F2026-03-31 ↗ |
JBLU JetBlue Airways Corp. | 1.74% | Unchanged | 33,621,735 | $4 | $148,608,000−$4,371,000 | 13F2026-03-31 ↗ |
MNRO Monro, Inc. | 0.95% | Unchanged | 5,078,573 | $16 | $81,460,000−$20,314,000 | 13F2026-03-31 ↗ |
SD SandRidge Energy, Inc. | 0.94% | Added 0.7% | 4,947,701+36,137 | $16 | $80,697,000+$9,823,000 | 13F2026-03-31 ↗ |
CZR Caesars Entertainment, Inc. | 0.75% | Unchanged | 2,440,109 | $26 | $64,492,000+$7,418,000 | 13F2026-03-31 ↗ |
BLCO Bausch Plus Lomb Corp. | 0.65% | Unchanged | 3,500,000 | $16 | $55,650,000−$4,130,000 | 13F2026-03-31 ↗ |
SWX Southwest Gas Holdings Inc. | 0.00% | Exited | 0−6,032,604 | $80 | $0−$482,729,000 | 13F2026-03-31 ↗ |
Reported price is calculated from the reported value and share count. It is not the investor's actual purchase price.
Filing history
Historical holdings
| Ticker | Company | Portfolio | Shares | Reported value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| IEP | Icahn Enterprises LP | 48.49% | 549,400,539 | $4,147,974,000 |
| CVI | CVR Energy Inc | 28.01% | 71,201,875 | $2,395,943,000 |
| UAN | CVR Partners, LP | 6.17% | 4,164,274 | $527,489,000 |
| CTRI | Centuri Holdings, Inc. | 4.90% | 14,336,044 | $418,756,000 |
| IFF | International Flavors and Fragrances Inc. | 3.63% | 4,275,000 | $310,151,000 |
| ECHO | EchoStar Corporation | 1.92% | 1,404,542 | $164,430,000 |
| AEP | American Electric Power Company | 1.85% | 1,205,300 | $157,991,000 |
| JBLU | JetBlue Airways Corp. | 1.74% | 33,621,735 | $148,608,000 |
| MNRO | Monro, Inc. | 0.95% | 5,078,573 | $81,460,000 |
| SD | SandRidge Energy, Inc. | 0.94% | 4,947,701 | $80,697,000 |
| CZR | Caesars Entertainment, Inc. | 0.75% | 2,440,109 | $64,492,000 |
| BLCO | Bausch Plus Lomb Corp. | 0.65% | 3,500,000 | $55,650,000 |
| Ticker | Company | Portfolio | Shares | Reported value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| IEP | Icahn Enterprises LP | 49.12% | 549,400,539 | $4,147,974,000 |
| CVI | CVR Energy Inc | 21.21% | 70,418,471 | $1,791,446,000 |
| SWX | Southwest Gas Holdings Inc. | 5.72% | 6,032,604 | $482,729,000 |
| UAN | CVR Partners, LP | 5.05% | 4,164,274 | $426,838,000 |
| ECHO | EchoStar Corporation | 4.32% | 3,354,542 | $364,639,000 |
| CTRI | Centuri Holdings, Inc. | 4.29% | 14,336,044 | $361,985,000 |
| IFF | International Flavors and Fragrances Inc. | 3.41% | 4,275,000 | $288,092,000 |
| JBLU | JetBlue Airways Corp. | 1.81% | 33,621,735 | $152,979,000 |
| AEP | American Electric Power Company | 1.65% | 1,205,300 | $138,983,000 |
| MNRO | Monro, Inc. | 1.21% | 5,078,573 | $101,775,000 |
| SD | SandRidge Energy, Inc. | 0.84% | 4,911,564 | $70,874,000 |
| BLCO | Bausch Plus Lomb Corp. | 0.71% | 3,500,000 | $59,780,000 |
| CZR | Caesars Entertainment, Inc. | 0.68% | 2,440,109 | $57,074,000 |
Investor background
Carl Icahn
“Good corporate governance is good business.”Carl Icahn
Carl Icahn is the Chairman of Icahn Enterprises and the leader of the investment strategy at Icahn Capital and its affiliated funds. After studying philosophy at Princeton and briefly attending medical school, he entered Wall Street in 1961. He formed Icahn & Co. in 1968 to trade options and arbitrage securities, and by the late 1970s was taking substantial and sometimes controlling positions in public companies.
The Icahn strategy begins with businesses trading below estimates of replacement cost, break-up value, cash-flow power or liquidation value. Unlike a passive deep-value investor, Icahn seeks a path that can close the discount. Depending on the situation, that may involve private negotiation, public letters, tender offers, proxy contests, board representation, asset sales, changes in capital allocation or acquisition of outright control.
Icahn’s advantage has been the combination of security analysis, capital-structure and legal work, large personal economic exposure and a willingness to sustain confrontation. Investments involving Texaco, RJR Nabisco, Apple, eBay, Forest Laboratories, Netflix and CVR Energy illustrate different forms of the method: settlement leverage, governance change, repurchases, separation of businesses or conversion of a security position into control of an operating company.
The record is consequential but uneven. Activist involvement can unlock value for all shareholders, yet it can also fail when the underlying business deteriorates, leverage overwhelms optionality or other shareholders reject the proposed change. Hertz’s bankruptcy, unsuccessful campaigns and losses within the investment funds demonstrate that influence does not eliminate operating, financing or valuation risk.
Icahn Enterprises is also a complex and imperfect performance proxy. It combines an investment segment with controlled operating businesses, uses a partnership structure and has historically paid large distributions. In 2024, the SEC settled disclosure charges against Icahn and IEP concerning pledges of IEP securities as collateral for personal loans. Those facts make it particularly important to distinguish the performance of IEP units, individual activist campaigns and the private investment funds.
Icahn remains worth following because he helped make shareholder activism a durable investment discipline and because the 2025 IEP annual report continued to identify him as the person setting and leading the investment funds’ strategy. His method is best understood as value investing combined with control rights and a catalyst, not simply as buying whatever appears in a delayed 13F filing.