Company research

NU HLDGS LTD

NU

Current Tracked Holders
2
One-Year Insider Activity
Purchases 0 $0
Sales 7 $10.3M

Price history

Price history loads when this section approaches view.

Quarter-End Change Analysis

2026-Q2REV. 1

Nu Holdings Q2 2026: monetization advanced with measured credit strain

Customer growth, higher revenue per active customer and Mexico break-even improved the earnings profile, while early-stage delinquencies and provisions rose.

By June 30, Nu had reinforced its ability to turn customer growth into earnings and demonstrated an important profitability inflection in Mexico. The improvement was tempered by higher early-stage delinquencies and allowances as the lender deliberately expanded into riskier credit segments.

Nu ended March with more than 135 million customers after adding about four million in the quarter. Revenue exceeded $5 billion for the first time, net income reached $871 million and return on equity was 29%. Monthly revenue per active customer rose to about $16, while the efficiency ratio improved to 17.6% from 19.9% in the preceding quarter. Mexico reached break-even and 15 million customers, reducing the evidence that international expansion must remain a prolonged earnings drag.

The 15-to-90-day nonperforming-loan ratio rose 89 basis points sequentially to 5.0%, while credit-loss allowances increased 33% to $1.79 billion and risk-adjusted net interest margin fell 100 basis points to 9.5%. Management attributed most early delinquency movement to seasonality and some to intentional risk expansion; the decline in 90-day-plus delinquencies to 6.5% is supporting evidence, but later loss performance is needed to validate the underwriting claim.

The shares declined 7.0% in a quarter when the S&P 500 gained 14.9%; their largest daily move was an 8.2% decline on June 2, with no same-day material company disclosure identified. The underperformance suggests expectations or valuation compressed despite better operating evidence, but the evidence does not support a precise catalyst for the largest move.

Current reported holders

Portfolio ManagerRecent activitySharesValuePortfolio
Chase ColemanTiger Global Management LLC
NUUnchanged
11,032,555
$147,395,000
0.61%
Glenn GreenbergBrave Warrior Advisors, LLC
NUNew
40,000
$534,000
0.01%

Long-term company research

Fundamental analysis

Updated 2026-08-03

Nu Holdings: Low-Cost Digital Distribution, Deposit Funding, and Credit Risk

Business Model and Scope

Nu operates a mobile-first financial-services platform through regulated subsidiaries in Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia. It began with a no-annual-fee credit card and expanded into current and savings accounts, prepaid cards, Pix and other payments, unsecured and secured loans, SME accounts and credit, investments, insurance distribution, marketplace services, travel, and mobile connectivity. At December 31, 2025 it reported 131 million customers: 113 million in Brazil, 14 million in Mexico, and more than 4 million in Colombia.

The economic engine is a bank and payments platform, not merely a software app. Nu takes retail deposits, holds liquid securities and central-bank balances, extends credit through cards and loans, earns interest spreads and fees, pays deposit and wholesale funding costs, absorbs expected credit losses, and complies with country-specific capital and liquidity rules. NuCore provides internally developed transaction authorization and core account processing; NuX supports credit decisions.

Products address five stated uses—spending, saving, investing, protecting, and borrowing—but economics differ. Deposits provide funding; card purchase volume generates fees and may generate revolving interest; personal and payroll loans earn interest while consuming capital and loss provisions; investments and insurance mostly generate commissions; newer travel, marketplace, and mobile products seek engagement and fee income. Analysis must distinguish cross-selling that improves lifetime contribution from product proliferation that adds support, compliance, and credit risk.

Customers and Purchasing Decisions

Nu serves consumers and small businesses in banking markets characterized by concentrated incumbents, expensive branches, high fees, uneven service, and limited formal credit. Customers value transparent pricing, immediate mobile access, no or low account and card fees, useful yields, responsive support, fast payments, and credit access. In Mexico and Colombia, deposit accounts also address low banking penetration; for many customers Nu provides a first credit card.

The customer has many alternatives: large incumbent banks, local digital banks, fintech wallets, credit unions or cooperatives, retailers, cash, card issuers, brokers, insurers, and government payment rails such as Pix. Opening another digital account is easy, and customers can hold several. Nu becomes harder to replace when salary, deposits, payments, credit history, investments, and recurring bills accumulate in one app. At the cutoff, 62% of active customers met Nu's definition of primary banking relationship, based on at least half of post-tax monthly income transferred out of NuAccount.

Trust has economic effects. Depositors must believe funds are available; borrowers need clear limits and collections; payment users need uptime and fraud resolution. Nu reported 83.4% activity and very low net churn, but both are company-defined metrics. Organic referrals can reduce acquisition cost only while service quality remains high. High deposit yields can attract balances without durable loyalty; the evidence must separate relationship deposits from rate-sensitive funding.

Profit Creation and Value Capture

Nu earns interest on credit-card receivables, loans, and liquid financial assets; fee and commission income comes mainly from credit and prepaid card activity, late fees, insurance, and other services. In 2025 interest income and financial-instrument gains were $13.435 billion and fee and commission income $2.340 billion, producing $15.775 billion of revenue. The $32.7 billion credit-card and personal-loan portfolio and $141.8 billion of card purchase volume were the principal balance and transaction drivers.

Profit is not revenue less app cost. Nu paid $4.579 billion of interest and other financial expense, including $3.877 billion on deposits; transactional expense was $366 million; expected credit loss was $4.205 billion. Gross profit after those costs was $6.625 billion, or 42.0% of revenue, down from 45.6% in 2024. Operating expense was $2.753 billion and net income $2.872 billion. Credit provision and funding cost therefore determine more of the economics than customer-support cost.

Unit economics improve when Nu acquires customers organically, activates them, becomes the primary account, cross-sells appropriate products, and spreads technology and support across higher revenue. Monthly average revenue per active customer rose to $13.3 in 2025 from $11.3, while reported monthly cost to serve was $0.8. That comparison excludes funding, credit loss, marketing, corporate cost, and capital, so it is evidence of operating scalability rather than full customer profit.

Deposits finance credit and liquid assets. Nu held $41.9 billion of deposits against a $32.7 billion credit portfolio; balances not deployed in customer credit earn on government securities and other instruments. Profit rises when asset yield exceeds deposit cost, credit loss, liquidity cost, and required capital. In Mexico, above-benchmark promotional yields helped build deposits; those balances can deepen relationships but temporarily compress spreads.

Stakeholders capture different parts of value. Customers receive lower fees, deposit yield, convenience, and credit access; depositors and wholesale creditors claim interest; Mastercard and payment systems receive network fees; governments impose reserve and capital requirements and collect tax; fraudsters and delinquent borrowers create losses; employees receive cash and equity compensation; shareholders receive residual earnings after provisions and dilution. Expected-credit-loss accounting recognizes lifetime estimates at origination, causing new growth to depress current gross profit before related interest fully arrives. That timing is real prudence, not proof that every new cohort will be profitable.

Industry Structure and Capital Cycle

Banking in Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia combines concentrated incumbents with increasingly open infrastructure. The five largest institutions held roughly 68% to 80% of loans and deposits across segments, according to the filing's central-bank-based analysis. Incumbents benefit from deposits, regulatory licenses, data, product breadth, and trust; their branches and legacy systems carry higher cost. Digital banks and fintechs attack fees and service while public payment systems such as Pix reduce proprietary transaction advantages.

Customer bargaining power is increasing because account opening and payments are portable. Deposit customers can move balances for yield, while borrowers with limited credit histories have fewer alternatives and can pay higher rates. Payment networks and app stores provide infrastructure; credit bureaus and cloud services supply data and computing. Regulators set capital, reserve, interchange, pricing, privacy, and consumer-protection constraints. Deposit insurance and official licenses can reduce customer risk and create entry barriers.

Entry at the user-interface level is inexpensive; building a regulated, funded, trusted balance sheet is not. A credible entrant needs licenses or bank partners, risk models, fraud controls, collections, customer support, capital, liquidity, and repeated access to low-cost funding. Scale can lower support cost and improve data, yet it also attracts supervision and increases systemic obligations. Nu's Brazilian conglomerate moved into the S2 regulatory segment in July 2025 and faced minimum regulatory capital of approximately $3.3 billion at year-end.

Credit has a classic capital cycle. Strong growth and benign losses encourage higher limits and new lenders; competition lowers price and underwriting thresholds; losses emerge after seasoning or recession, when capital is harder to raise. Deposit competition similarly produces above-market yields until weaker competitors retreat. Nu's 47% FX-neutral growth in its interest-earning portfolio and expansion into newer geographies increase earnings potential and uncertainty. Durable value requires pricing through lifetime loss, not maximizing originations during favorable vintages.

Sources and Durability of Competitive Advantage

Nu's most plausible advantage is a self-reinforcing combination of low-cost digital distribution, brand, proprietary core systems, data, and product breadth. Approximately 80% to 90% of customers were acquired organically on average each year since inception, according to the company. More customers generate transaction and repayment data; NuX can use that information to set small initial limits and increase them as behavior becomes observable; better offers deepen activity and deposits; higher engagement raises revenue without equivalent support growth.

NuCore reduces dependence on third-party processors and allows common infrastructure to support products and countries. An all-digital model avoids branches and can serve small balances economically. Large, diversified retail deposits can be cheaper and more stable than wholesale funding, while product breadth can turn a credit-card relationship into a primary account. Customer count rose from 53.9 million in 2021 to 131 million in 2025 while revenue rose from $1.698 billion to $15.775 billion, consistent with scale and monetization.

These mechanisms are not unassailable. Incumbents possess extensive deposits, credit expertise, licenses, and capital; competitors can copy interfaces and waive fees; Pix makes payments interoperable; high deposit yields can buy rather than earn loyalty. Proprietary models may fail when macro conditions or customer mix changes. Nu's internally estimated cost advantage and NPS require corroboration through stable credit losses, funding costs, complaints, and retention across a downturn. Scale becomes a disadvantage if regulation, fraud, or operational complexity grows faster than controls.

Operating System and Strategic Trade-offs

The operating system begins with mobile onboarding and fraud screening, then often grants a low credit limit or deposit account. As transaction and repayment data accumulate, Nu can adjust limits, offer personal or secured loans, and cross-sell savings, investment, insurance, SME, travel, or mobile products. Customer support and collections feed information back into models. This low-and-grow approach trades early revenue for information and seeks to avoid making a large first decision on thin bureau data.

NuCore processes accounts and card authorization on cloud infrastructure. Centralized software can reuse components across products and geographies, but each country requires local legal entities, payments integration, reporting, credit data, and customer behavior. Mexico and Colombia are not copies of Brazil: funding costs, financial inclusion, delinquency, and regulation differ. The 2025 filing acknowledged that delinquency could be higher in the newer markets.

Credit management is the critical production process. Underwriting determines approval and limits; pricing must cover funding and lifetime loss; fraud systems distinguish theft from credit risk; collections seek recovery without violating consumer rules. The 90-day consumer-finance NPL ratio was 6.6% at December 2025, and total ECL for cards and loans equaled 15.4% of receivables. Those measures are mix-dependent and should be read with cohort seasoning, write-offs, recoveries, and coverage.

Deposits, liquid securities, compulsory central-bank balances, and credit growth must be coordinated by currency and entity. Regulatory restrictions can prevent freely transferring capital or liquidity among subsidiaries. New products are valuable when they improve primary-account use or fee contribution; more than 100 launches in 2025 also create testing, reliability, and compliance load. The operating scorecard should prioritize risk-adjusted revenue, complaints, uptime, deposit retention, cohort loss, and capital use—not launch count.

Financial Resilience

Nu relied primarily on retail deposits. At December 31, 2025 deposits were $41.9 billion, of which 92.5% were payable on demand. Against that, it held $31.4 billion of cash, cash equivalents, and securities—mainly liquid government bonds—and $9.5 billion of compulsory and other central-bank deposits. This liquidity composition is substantial, but not all assets are freely transferable among regulated entities and market liquidity can change under stress.

The $32.7 billion credit portfolio carried borrower default and duration risk, while deposits can reprice or leave quickly. Nu's consumer-finance NPL ratio and ECL burden are already meaningful. A severe scenario would combine unemployment, currency depreciation, higher deposit rates, withdrawals, fraud, and falling recoveries. Interest margins would compress as provisions rise; growth could require capital precisely when internal earnings weaken.

Operating cash flow was $3.500 billion in 2025, but bank cash flow statements are dominated by deposit inflows, credit growth, securities, and central-bank balances and cannot be interpreted like an industrial company's free cash flow. The relevant safeguards are entity-level capital, liquidity, asset-liability matching, deposit concentration, and loss coverage. The Brazilian minimum capital requirement and country rules restrict upstream distributions but protect creditors and customers. Financial resilience appears strong at the cutoff; its durability has not been tested through a severe cycle at current scale.

Capital Allocation and Shareholder Outcomes

Internal capital has funded credit growth, liquid assets, regulatory capital, technology, and expansion in Mexico and Colombia. This reinvestment creates value if risk-adjusted customer lifetime contribution exceeds capital and operating cost. Entering the United States after conditional charter approval, and widening nonfinancial products, would add fixed cost and execution risk before local scale; Brazil and Mexico may offer higher-confidence uses of capital.

Nu has never paid a cash dividend and expects to retain earnings. That is appropriate while regulated subsidiaries and new markets can compound at attractive returns, but reported growth does not prove incremental returns. Management should disclose country and product profitability after ECL, funding, and capital. Acquisitions and new ventures should be compared with the return from deepening primary relationships in existing markets.

Share-based compensation was $272 million in 2025 and is a real ownership cost. The dual-class structure gives Class B twenty votes per share; founder David Velez controlled 74.3% of voting power at the cutoff. This supports long-horizon execution but weakens minority shareholders' ability to discipline expansion, related transactions, or dilution. Shareholder outcomes should be judged by risk-adjusted earnings and tangible capital per diluted share after stock awards—not adjusted income alone.

Legal and Regulatory Exposure

Nu's subsidiaries are supervised by the Central Bank of Brazil, Mexico's central bank and banking commission, and Colombia's financial supervisor. Rules cover licensing, capital, reserves, liquidity, credit, deposit protection, payments, consumer treatment, anti-money-laundering, sanctions, privacy, cybersecurity, collections, pricing, and model governance. S2 classification in Brazil increases prudential obligations; a U.S. charter would add Federal Reserve supervision and reporting if completed.

Legal exposure can alter products rather than merely produce fines. Interest and fee caps, payroll-loan rules, Pix or interchange changes, deposit-yield regulation, open finance, or required fraud reimbursement can change unit economics. Rapid model-driven underwriting raises fair-treatment, explainability, and data-use risk. Outages or account blocks can prompt restitution and damage the trust supporting deposits.

At year-end 2025 provisions for tax, civil, and labor proceedings totaled $30.9 million, including $22.0 million for civil claims mainly related to card operations. A Colombian class action alleged failure by 52 institutions to automate exemptions from a financial-transactions tax and stated an aggregate claim of approximately $2.5 billion; Nu's proportional exposure could not be estimated and was classified as possible. The amount and early stage make it a material uncertainty even though the claim is not solely against Nu.

Conclusion, Uncertainties and Disconfirming Evidence

Nu creates value by replacing branch-heavy distribution with a low-cost mobile platform, acquiring customers largely through referrals, funding credit with retail deposits, and using transaction data to expand limits and products. It retains value through proprietary core and risk systems, high engagement, and operating scale. Between 2021 and 2025, customer count more than doubled, monthly revenue per active customer rose, and 2025 net income reached $2.9 billion.

Contrary evidence matters. Gross margin fell in 2025 as deposit interest and credit provision grew faster than revenue. Expected credit loss was $4.2 billion; deposits are mostly on demand; newer markets may have higher delinquency; and the current scale has not experienced a severe credit and funding shock. Many metrics are company-defined, competitors can imitate features, public payment rails reduce switching cost, and founder voting control limits outside discipline.

The thesis would be invalidated by primary-account or activity rates falling despite customer growth; deposits becoming persistently promotional or unstable; cohort credit losses exceeding pricing; Mexico or Colombia consuming capital without converging toward Brazilian economics; operating cost rising with product complexity; repeated outages, fraud, or regulatory sanctions; capital trapped in subsidiaries; equity awards preventing per-share compounding; or global expansion proceeding before existing markets demonstrate through-cycle returns. Confirmation requires stable risk-adjusted margin, deposit retention, capital surplus, and per-share earnings through stress—not customer count alone.

Business quality does not by itself establish investment attractiveness; valuation depends on the price paid and the expectations embedded in it.

Financial data loads when this section approaches view.

Insider activity

1-year insider activity

Open-market purchases and sales only.

Checked 2026-10-02
DateInsiderTypeSharesPriceValueSource
2026-08-25Junqueira Cristina Helena ZingarettiUS CEO & Chief Growth OfficerSale65,000$15$956,456SEC ↗
2026-08-24Junqueira Cristina Helena ZingarettiUS CEO & Chief Growth OfficerSale25,000$15$375,000SEC ↗
2026-08-14Fragelli Henrique Camossa SaldanhaChief Risk OfficerSale221,707$16$3.5MSEC ↗
2026-08-14Junqueira Cristina Helena ZingarettiUS CEO & Chief Growth OfficerSale50,000$16$790,000SEC ↗
2026-05-15Sands Anita MDirectorSale21,000$12$257,040SEC ↗
2026-03-23Junqueira Cristina Helena ZingarettiOfficer, US CEO & Chief Growth OfficerSale220,000$15$3.3MSEC ↗
2026-03-23Junqueira Cristina Helena ZingarettiOfficer, US CEO & Chief Growth OfficerSale80,000$15$1.2MSEC ↗